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SHORT PROOFS FOR SLOW CONSISTENCY
ANTON FREUND AND FEDOR PAKHOMOV
Abstract. Let Con(T) ↾ x denote the finite consistency statement “there
are no proofs of contradiction in T with ≤ x symbols”. For a large class of
natural theories T, Pudla´k has shown that the lengths of the shortest proofs
of Con(T)↾n in the theory T itself are bounded by a polynomial in n. At the
same time he conjectures that T does not have polynomial proofs of the finite
consistency statements Con(T+Con(T))↾n. In contrast we show that Peano
arithmetic (PA) has polynomial proofs of Con(PA + Con∗(PA))↾n, where
Con∗(PA) is the slow consistency statement for Peano arithmetic, introduced
by S.-D. Friedman, Rathjen and Weiermann. We also obtain a new proof of
the result that the usual consistency statement Con(PA) is equivalent to ε0
iterations of slow consistency. Our argument is proof-theoretic, while previous
investigations of slow consistency relied on non-standard models of arithmetic.
Consider the finite consistency statement Con(T) ↾ x, which expresses that every
proof in the theory T that has ≤ x symbols is not a proof of contradiction. If T is
consistent and n is a fixed numeral then Con(T)↾n can be established in a very weak
theory, simply by checking the finitely many proofs of length at most n explicitly
(Σ1-completeness). Note that the number of potential proofs to be checked is
exponential in n.
As a refinement of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, H. Friedman (un-
published) and Pudla´k [Pud86] have made estimates on the length of the shortest
proofs of the statements Con(T) ↾ n in the theory T itself. For a large class of
theories they have shown that no proof of Con(T) ↾ n in T can have less than nε
symbols, for a suitable ε > 0 (see Section 1 for a more detailed definition of proof
length).
In the present paper we are more interested in upper bounds: Pudla´k [Pud86]
has shown that for theories T from a wide class,
T ⊢ Con(T)↾n with polynomial in n proofs.
Here and in the sequel we adopt the following terminology: For a family of sentences
ϕn we say that T ⊢ ϕn with polynomial in n proofs if there is a polynomial p(x)
such that for each n there is a T-proof of ϕn with at most p(n) symbols.
At the same time Pudla´k conjectures that T does not have polynomial proofs
for the finite consistency of considerably stronger theories. A survey of related
conjectures and many new results can be found in [Pud17]. Specifically [Pud86,
Problem I] asks whether we have
T ⊢ Con(T+Con(T))↾n with polynomial in n proofs?
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The expected negative answer remains open. This is no surprise because the neg-
ative answer would imply co -NP 6= NP and hence P 6= NP, as pointed out in
[Pud86, Proposition 6.2].
In contrast with this there is an interesting new result of Hrubesˇ (see [Pud17,
Theorem 3.4]) which tests the boundaries of Pudla´k’s conjecture: For any formula
ϕ which is consistent with a sequential and finitely axiomatized theory T there is
a true Π1-formula ψ such that we have T+ ϕ 0 ψ but
T ⊢ Con(T + ψ)↾n with polynomial in n proofs.
Hrubesˇ constructs the formula ψ by Rosser-style diagonalization.
The aim of the present paper is to exhibit a natural example of the same phe-
nomenon: We show
(1) PA ⊢ Con(PA+Con∗(PA))↾n with polynomial in n proofs,
where Con∗(PA) is the slow consistency statement due to S.-D. Friedman, Rathjen
and Weiermann [FRW13].
This statement is defined as
Con∗(PA) ≡ ∀x(Fε0(x)↓→ Con(IΣx)).
Here Fε0 denotes the function at stage ε0 of the fast-growing hierarchy. It is well-
known that Peano arithmetic does not prove the statement ∀xFε0(x)↓, i.e. it does
not prove that the computation of Fε0(x) terminates for any input x (see Section 1
for more details). Moreover ε0 is the first level of the fast-growing hierarchy with
this property. As shown in [FRW13] the usual consistency statement Con(PA) is
unprovable inPA+Con∗(PA), while Con∗(PA) is still unprovable inPA. Note that
the latter is an instance of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem since Con∗(PA)
is equivalent (over IΣ1) to the standard consistency statment for PA given by
an alternative enumeration process of axioms, where the axiom of Σn-induction
appears only at the step Fε0 (n).
The main technical result of the present paper is Theorem 2.3, which states
(2) IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x(Fε0 (x)↓→ Con(PA+Con
∗(PA))↾x).
To deduce (1) it suffices to provide polynomial in n proofs of the statements Fε0(n)↓.
The latter reduce to suitable instances of arithmetical transfinite induction, which
can be proved by Gentzen’s classical construction. In Section 3 we give a poly-
nomial version of this construction, inspired by the remarkable similarity between
Gentzen’s proof of transfinite induction and the method of shortening cuts.
Let us point out that we will in fact prove a stronger version of (2), with the
slow uniform Π2-reflection principle RFN
∗
Π2(PA) at the place of slow consistency.
As a consequence, one can strengthen Con∗(PA) to RFN∗Π2(PA) in statement
(1) as well. This is remarkable because the Π2-statement RFN
∗
Π2(PA) extends
Peano arithmetic by a new provably total function (see [Fre17a, Section 3]). In
contrast, the above result of Hrubesˇ only adds Π1-axioms, which do not yield any
new provably total functions.
We note that the usual reflection principle RFNΠ2(PA) is IΣ1-provably equival-
ent to ∀xFε0(x)↓. There is a similar characterization for RFN
∗
Π2(PA) in terms of
the totality of a function F ∗ε0 that has intermediate rate of growth: It eventually
dominates any function Fα with α < ε0, but is considerably slower than Fε0 (see
Section 1 for more details).
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Proposition 3.7 shows that (2) becomes false if one replaces Con∗(PA) by the
usual consistency statement Con(PA). This means that Pudla´k’s conjecture itself
cannot be refuted by our approach.
Finally we remark that statement (2) yields new proofs for several known result
about slow consistency: In Corollary 2.4 we deduce
PA+Con∗(PA) 0 Con(PA),
as originally shown by S.-D. Friedman, Rathjen and Weiermann [FRW13].
Corollary 2.6 recovers an even stronger result, first established in [Fre17b, HP16]:
The usual consistency statement Con(PA) is equivalent to ε0 iterations of slow
consistency. The new proofs of these results are considerably different from those
known so far: They only use proof-theoretic methods, whereas non-standard models
of arithmetic were central to all previous arguments. Specifically, our proof of (2)
is based on Buchholz and Wainer’s [BW87] computational analysis of Peano arith-
metic via an infinitary proof system. This is inspired by the appendix of [FRW13],
which contains a similar result to (2), but without the occurrence of slow consist-
ency. To formalize arguments about infinite proofs in the meta theory IΣ1 we use
the remarkably elegant notation systems of Buchholz [Buc91]. More information
on this approach can be found in Section 2.
1. Preliminaries
We begin this section with some general remarks about the length of proofs:
Following Pudla´k [Pud86, Pud17] we count the total number of symbols in a proof,
rather than just the number of inferences. In other words, the length of a proof
is essentially the number of digits in its Go¨del code. We will be most interested
in proofs in Peano arithmetic, which we take to be axiomatized as usual. Let us
also agree to work with Hilbert-style proofs in sequence form, even if this choice
does not appear to be essential: Kraj´ıcˇek has given a polynomial simulation of
sequence-proofs by tree-proofs while Eder has shown that Hilbert-style proofs and
sequent calculus proofs are polynomially equivalent (see [Pud98] for both results).
As is common in the literatur on proof length we use the binary version of the
numerals n,
0 = 0, 2n+ 2 = n+ 1(1 + 1), 2n+ 1 = n(1 + 1) + 1.
It is easy to observe that the length of n is O(lg(n)). Thus the trivial lower bound
for the length of a proof of the formula ϕ(n) is logarithmic rather than linear. As the
present paper is only concerned with upper bounds that are polynomial, without
any significant changes we could work with the usual unary numerals. If there is no
danger of misunderstanding the n-th numeral will be denoted by n rather than n.
Our next aim is to give a precise definition of slow consistency: Recall that
the proof-theoretic ordinal of Peano arithmetic is the first fixed-point ε0 = ω
ε0 of
ordinal exponentiation. To each limit ordinal α < ε0 one assigns a fundamental
sequence n 7→ {α}(n) with α = supn∈ω{α}(n): Write α = β+ω
γ , where 0 < γ < α
is the smallest exponent in the Cantor normal form of α, and put
{β + ωγ}(n) = β + ω{γ}(n) if γ is a limit,
{β + ωγ}(n) = β + ωδ · (n+ 1) if γ = δ + 1.
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To extend the notion to ε0 itself, consider the operation (n, α) 7→ ω
α
n recursively
defined by ωα0 = α and ω
α
n+1 = ω
ωαn . Writing ωn for ω
1
n we put
{ε0}(n) = ωn+1.
It will later be convenient to have fundamental sequences for zero and successor
ordinals: Here we put {0}(n) = n and {α + 1}(n) = α. Now we can define the
fast-growing hierarchy of functions Fα : N→ N by recursion over α ≤ ε0, setting
F0(n) := n+ 1,
Fα+1(n) := F
n+1
α (n),
Fλ(n) := F{λ}(n)(n) for λ limit.
Note that the superscript in the second line denotes iterations.
It is well known that the ordinals below ε0 can be arithmetized via the notion
of Cantor normal form. We adopt the particularly efficient coding due to Som-
mer [Som95]. This is convenient because Sommer gives a ∆0-formula Fα(x) = y
with free variables α, x, y which uniformly defines the graphs of the functions in
the fast-growing hierarchy. Basic properties of these functions (but not their total-
ity) are then provable in IΣ1. Strictly speaking, Sommer only considers ordinals
α < ε0. The case α = ε0 has been treated in [Fre17a, Section 2]. We write Fα(x)↓
and Fα ↓ to abbreviate the formulas ∃y Fα(x) = y resp. ∀x∃y Fα(x) = y.
To complete the definition of slow consistency, recall that IΣn is the fragment
of Peano arithmetic which restricts induction to Σn-formulas. It is standard to
define these fragments inside Peano arithmetic. Using the formalization PrT(ϕ) of
provability in r.e. theories T (see Feferman’s paper [Fef60]) in the usual way we
obtain a formula
Con(IΣx) ≡ ¬PrIΣx(0 = 1)
with free variable x, which states that the x-th fragment is consistent. The defining
equivalence of slow consistency, namely
Con∗(PA) ≡ ∀x(Fε0(x)↓→ Con(IΣx)),
is now fully explained. As we already mentioned in Introduction one could equi-
valently define the notion of slow consistency as the standard formalization of the
notion of consistency for an alternative (slowed-down) enumeration of the axioms
of PA.
To avoid confusion we point out that [Fre17b, HP16] also considered different
“shifted” versions of slow consistency. Namely, statements of the form
∀x(Fε0(x)↓→ Con(IΣmax(x+s,1))),
for some s ∈ Z. We conjecture that our results could be generalized to cases of s ≤ 1.
Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, we prefer to work with S.-D. Friedman,
Rathjen andWeiermann’s [FRW13] original version Con∗(PA) in the present paper.
Note that since the analogue of Corollary 2.6 doesn’t hold for s > 1 (see [HP16,
Fre17b]), our results cannot be generalized to these cases.
As in [Fre17b] our analysis of slow consistency will make crucial use of the notion
of slow uniform Π2-reflection. Up to the aforementioned index shift this notion is
defined as
RFN∗Π2(PA) ≡ ∀x(Fε0(x)↓→ RFNΠ2(IΣx)),
SHORT PROOFS FOR SLOW CONSISTENCY 5
where RFNΠ2(IΣx) refers to uniform Π2-reflection (equivalently Σ1-reflection) over
the fragment IΣx. Using a truth predicate TrueΠ2(·) for Π2-formulas the latter can
be given as a single formula, namely
RFNΠ2(IΣx) ≡ ∀ϕ (“ϕ a Π2-formula” ∧ PrIΣx(ϕ)→ TrueΠ2(ϕ)).
Note that we have
IΣ1 ⊢ RFN
∗
Π2(PA)→ Con
∗(PA),
since RFNΠ2(IΣx) implies Con(IΣx) for each x. In fact, slow Π2-reflection implies
that iterations of slow consistency are progressive (i.e., it provides the induction
step to establish iterations of slow consistency). As for slow consistency one could
show that uniform slow reflection is equivalent to uniform reflection for slowed-down
axiomatization of PA. It is also interesting to observe that slow consistency and
slow reflection can be derived from a common notion of slow proof (see e.g. [Fre17a,
Section 2]).
To conclude this section, let us recall the computational analysis of slow reflec-
tion from [Fre17a, Section 3]: It is well-known that RFNΠ2(IΣx) is IΣ1-provably
equivalent to the totality of the function Fωx from the fast-growing hierarchy (see
the model-theoretic argument in [Par80], the proof-theoretic argument in [Bek03],
and the explicitly uniform proof in [Fre15]). As in [Fre17a, Corollary 3.2] we thus
have
IΣ1 ⊢ RFN
∗
Π2(PA)↔ ∀x(Fε0 (x)↓→ Fωx ↓).
Now consider the function
F ∗ε0(x) := Fωy (x) with y := F
−1
ε0
(x) := max({z ≤ x |Fε0 (z) ≤ x} ∪ {0}).
According to [Fre17a, Definition 3.3] the graphs of F−1ε0 and F
∗
ε0
are ∆0-definable.
The function F−1ε0 is monotone, non-stabilizing, and extemely slow growing func-
tion since it is an inverse of the total fast-growing function Fε0 . It is easy to see
that F−1ε0 is IΣ1-provably total, although the fact that values of F
−1
ε0
don’t stabilize
isn’t provable even in PA. The function F ∗ε0 dominates any provably total function
of Peano arithmetic. But at the same time it is much slower than the usual func-
tion Fε0 : The latter dominates any provably total function of the theory PA+F
∗
ε0
↓,
as shown in [Fre17a, Theorem 3.10]. Following [Fre17a, Proposition 3.4] the above
equivalence can be transformed into
IΣ1 ⊢ RFN
∗
Π2(PA)↔ F
∗
ε0
↓ .
It is the statement F ∗ε0 ↓ (rather than RFN
∗
Π2(PA) or Con
∗(PA)) that will be
susceptive to proof-theoretic analysis.
2. A Proof-Theoretic Approach to Slow Consistency
In this section we analyse the theory PA + F ∗ε0 ↓ (see the previous section)
by proof-theoretic means. Our approach is inspired by the appendix of [FRW13],
which is concerned with the finite consistency of PA rather than PA + F ∗ε0 ↓.
As it turns out, the function F ∗ε0 is sufficiently slower than Fε0 to be accomod-
ated. As in [FRW13] we use the infinitary proof system introduced by Buchholz
and Wainer [BW87] in their analysis of the provably total functions of Peano
arithmetic. As usual in ordinal analysis this system deduces sequents, i.e. fi-
nite sets Γ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} of formulas which are interpreted as the disjunction∨
Γ ≡ ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn. In particular, the empty sequent 〈〉 is the canonical way to
express a contradiction. We write Γ, ϕ rather than Γ ∪ {ϕ} for the extension of
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a sequent by a formula. A typical feature of ordinal analysis is the ω-rule, which
allows to deduce Γ, ∀xϕ(x) if we have proofs of Γ, ϕ(n) for each numeral. Note that
this allows us to work with closed formulas only. In the presence of the ω-rule,
proofs are infinite trees. There are several ways to work with these trees in a fi-
nitistic meta theory. A particularly elegant approach is due to Buchholz [Buc91]:
The idea is to denote infinite proofs by finite terms which describe their role in the
cut elimination process. For example, if h denotes an infinite proof then we have
another term Eh which denotes the result of cut elimination. It turns out that all
relevant operations on infinite proofs can be recast as primitive recursive functions
on these finite terms. In particular, there is a primitive recursive function s which
computes the immediate subproofs. If the last rule of h (also to be read off by a
primitive recursive function) is not a cut then we have sn(Eh) = Esn(h). Intuitively
this means that the n-th subproof of Eh is the result of cut elimination in the n-th
subproof of h. Officially, the given equation is simply a clause in the definition of s
by recursion over terms. In the same way one defines primitive recursive functions
which read off the end-sequent, the ordinal height and the cut rank of (the infinite
derivation denoted by) a given term. We say that h codes an infinite proof ⊢αd Γ if
it has ordinal height α, cut rank d and end-sequent Γ. By induction over terms one
can show that proofs are “locally correct”. For example, the theory IΣ1 proves that
the ordinal height of sn(h) is smaller than the ordinal height of h, provided that the
last rule of h is not an axiom. It also proves that the end-sequents of the immediate
subtrees sn(h) provide the assumptions required by the last rule of h. In [Fre15] we
use Buchholz’ approach to give a detailed formalization of the proof system from
[BW87] in IΣ1.
The proof system from [BW87] is special in that it keeps track of computational
information about the derived sequents. For this purpose, the language of first
order arithmetic is extended by a new predicate · ∈ N . The proof system contains
an axiom 0 ∈ N and a rule which allows to infer n+ 1 ∈ N from n ∈ N . Thus we
can deduce n ∈ N for any numeral n, which suggests to interpret N as the set of
all natural numbers. The interpretation of N becomes more interesting if we look
at (essentially) cut free proofs of Σ1-formulas: Now the idea is to interpret N as a
finite approximation to the natural numbers, which bounds the size of existential
witnesses. More precisely, a ΣN -formula is built from arithmetical prime formulas
and prime formulas n ∈ N by the connectives ∧,∨ and “relativized” existential
quantifiers ∃y∈N (as usual, we write ∃y∈Nϕ and ∀y∈Nϕ to abbreviate ∃y(y ∈ N∧ϕ)
resp. ∀y(y /∈ N ∨ ϕ)). Such a formula is called true in K if it is true under the
interpretation N = {m | 3m < K}. As all quantifiers are relativized, truth in K is
primitive recursively decidable. By a ΣN -sequent we mean a sequent that consist
of ΣN -formulas and prime formulas of the form n /∈ N (but the latter may not
appear as subformulas of compound formulas). Such a sequent is called true in K
if it contains a ΣN -formula which is true in K. Otherwise it is false in K. The
point of the formulas n /∈ N in a ΣN -sequent Γ is that they determine an “input”,
namely
k(Γ) := max({2} ∪ {3n | the formula n /∈ N occurs in Γ}).
We say that the ΣN -sequent Γ is bounded by F : N→ N if this function transforms
the input k(Γ) into a correct output, i.e. if Γ is true in F (k(Γ)). For example,
the ΣN -sequent n /∈ N, ∃y∈N R(n, y) is bounded by F if we have R(n,m) for some
number m with 3m < F (max{2, 3n}). In this terminology [BW87, Lemma 5] reads
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as follows: If we have ⊢α0 Γ where Γ is a Σ
N -sequent then Γ is bounded by the func-
tion Fα from the fast-growing hierarchy. To make this computational interpretation
sound, one needs rather restrictive ordinal assignments. In particular, the ordinal
“height” assigned to a proof is related but not quite equal to the usual height of
the underlying tree. From ⊢α Γ and β > α we cannot in general infer ⊢β Γ. This
is only allowed if we have α <k β for k = k(Γ). The latter means that one can
descend from β to α via k-th members of the fundamental sequence, i.e. that there
is a sequence β = γ0, . . . , γn = α with γi+1 = {γi}(k). Note that the same relation
is often denoted by β →k α. The rule which allows to infer ⊢
β Γ from ⊢α Γ and
α <k(Γ) β is called accumulation. We refer to [BW87, Section 3] for the full details
of the infinite proof system. Also, the reader can find a complete list of rules as
part of the case distinction in the proof of Proposition 2.1 below.
To analyse the theory PA + F ∗ε0 ↓ we extend the proof system from [BW87] by
the new axioms
n /∈ N, ∃y∈NF
∗
ε0
(n) = y,
for any numeral n and with arbitrary side formulas. More precisely, in the language
of [BW87] the ∆0-formula F
∗
ε0
(x) = y is represented by the corresponding element-
ary relation symbol. This ensures that ∃y∈NF
∗
ε0
(n) = y is a ΣN -formula. We write
∗ ⊢αd Γ to denote infinite proofs in the extended system. Starting with the new
axioms, two applications of ∨-introduction yield ∗⊢20 n /∈ N ∨ ∃y∈NF
∗
ε0
(n) = y. By
the ω-rule we infer ∗⊢30 ∀x∈N∃y∈NF
∗
ε0
(x) = y. In view of 3 <2 ω accumulation gives
∗ ⊢ω0 ∀x∈N∃y∈NF
∗
ε0
(x) = y, which means that the axiom F ∗ε0 ↓≡ ∀x∃yF
∗
ε0
(x) = y
of the theory PA + F ∗ε0 ↓ can be embedded in the sense of [BW87]. In the pres-
ence of the new axioms, we cannot eliminate cuts with cut formula ∃y∈NF
∗
ε0
(n) = y
resp. ∀y∈NF
∗
ε0
(n) 6= y. Technically, the simplest solution is to stipulate that the for-
mula ∃y∈NF
∗
ε0
(n) = y and its negation have “length” 0 (cf. [BW87, Definition 5]).
Then the cut elimination result in [BW87, Theorem 4] remains valid, i.e. we can
remove all cut formulas of length > 0. Let us stress that a proof of cut rank 0 may
now contain cuts over formulas n ∈ N and ∃y∈NF
∗
ε0
(n) = y (and their negations).
As we will see, these cuts do not obstruct the computational interpretation sketched
in the previous paragraph. We point out that the proof of [Fre17a, Proposition 3.9]
embeds the axiom F ∗ε0 ↓ in a different way: This allows for full cut elimination but
it relies on the totality of F ∗ε0 , which is not available in a weak meta theory. We
can now state the main technical result of this section:
Proposition 2.1. For each primitive recursive function f there is an n ∈ N such
that we have
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x≥n(Fε0 (x+ 2)↓→ ∗0
ω·f(x)
x 〈〉).
Proof. By meta induction on the definition of f we get IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x>0 f(x) ≤ Fn(x) for
some n > 0. To see that the theorem holds for this number, consider an arbitrary
x ≥ n with Fε0(x+2)↓. Aiming at a contradiction, assume that we have ∗⊢
ω·f(x)
x 〈〉.
Cut elimination [BW87, Theorem 4] yields ∗⊢
ωω·f(x)x
0 〈〉. Recall that this proof may
still contain cuts over prime formulas and formulas ∃y∈N F
∗
ε0
(n) = y. By primitive
recursion we will define a sequence of pairs 〈hi,Ki〉 with the following properties:
(i) The number hi codes an infinite proof ∗⊢
αi
0 Γi, where Γi is a Σ
N -sequent.
(ii) We have Fωx+2+αi(k(Γi)) = Ki, and Γi is false in Ki.
(iii) We have αi+1 <k(Γi) αi and Ki+1 ≤ Ki. If Ki+1 = Ki then Γi+1 = Γi.
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Given such a sequence, the desired contradiction can be deduced as in the appendix
of [FRW13]: The inequality Ki+1 < Ki can only hold finitely often, say, only
for i < M (to see this, assume the contrary and argue by Σ1-induction to deduce a
contradiction). By condition (iii) we get ΓM = ΓM+1 = . . . and thus
αM >k(ΓM ) αM+1 >k(ΓM ) . . .
This is impossible, since IΣ1 proves that any descending sequence of ordinals with
constant step-down must terminate (see [KS81, Proposition 2.9] or the more explicit
[Fre15, Lemma 4.7]). It remains to construct a primitive recursive sequence 〈hi,Ki〉
which satisfies conditions (i-iii). For h0 we take the proof ∗⊢
ωω·f(x)x
0 〈〉 from above.
Before we can set K0 := Fωx+2+ωω·f(x)x
(2) we must show that this value is defined.
By [FRW13, Section 2] we have
ωx+3 = ω
ωx+2 >x+2 ω
ωx+1+1 >x+2 ω
ωx+1 · 3 >x+2 ωx+2 · 2 + 1.
By assumption Fε0(x+2) = Fωx+3(x+2) is defined. Using [FRW13, Lemma 2.3] we
conclude that Fωx+2·2+1(x+ 2) is defined as well. In view of [Som95, Theorem 5.3]
this is equivalent to saying that F x+3ωx+2·2(x+2) is defined. In particular F
2
ωx+2·2(x+2)
is defined. By [Som95, Proposition 5.4] we have Fn(x+2) ≤ Fωx+2·2(x+2), so that
Fωx+2·2(Fn(x+ 2)) is defined as well. For later use, let us record
Fωx+2·2(Fn(x+ 2)) ≤ F
2
ωx+2·2(x+ 2) ≤ F
x+3
ωx+2·2
(x+ 2) ≤ Fε0(x+ 2).
From f(x) ≤ Fn(x) ≤ Fn(x + 2) we infer ω
ω >Fn(x+2) ω · f(x), which in turn
implies ωx+2 · 2 >Fn(x+2) ωx+2 + ω
ω·f(x)
x . Then [FRW13, Lemma 2.3] tells us that
F
ωx+2+ω
ω·f(x)
x
(Fn(x + 2)) is defined. In view of 2 ≤ Fn(x + 2) we learn that the
value F
ωx+2+ω
ω·f(x)
x
(2) is defined, as desired. Let us also record
K0 = Fωx+2+ωω·f(x)x
(2) ≤ Fωx+2·2(Fn(x+ 2)) ≤ Fε0(x+ 2).
Assuming that 〈hi,Ki〉 is already constructed, we now define 〈hi+1,Ki+1〉 by case
distinction on the last rule of the proof hi (which can be read off by a primitive
recursive function, as explained above). Note that this cannot be the ω-rule, as we
assume that Γi is a Σ
N -sequent.
Case. The last rule is an axiom of [BW87]. Then Γi contains a true arithmetical
prime formula, or the formula 0 ∈ N , or the formulas m /∈ N,m ∈ N for some
numeral m. It is easy to see that each of these possibilities makes Γi true in Ki,
contradicting (ii). Thus the last rule cannot, in fact, be an axiom of [BW87].
Case. The last rule is an axiom m /∈ N, ∃y∈N F
∗
ε0
(m) = y. Again, we show that
this is impossible because it makes Γi true in Ki: As m /∈ N occurs in Γi we have
m ≤ 3m ≤ k(Γi) < Ki ≤ K0 ≤ Fε0(x+ 2),
and thus F−1ε0 (m) < x+ 2. Using [Som95, Proposition 5.4] one infers
3 · F ∗ε0(m) = 3 · FωF−1ε0 (m)
(m) ≤ 3 · Fωx+1(k(Γi)) ≤ Fωx+1(k(Γi))
2 <
< F 2ωx+1(k(Γi)) ≤ Fωx+1+1(k(Γi)) ≤ Fωx+2(k(Γi)) ≤ Fωx+2+αi(k(Γi)) = Ki.
In particular all involved expressions are defined. This means that ∃y∈NF
∗
ε0
(m) = y
is true in Ki, as promised.
Case. Assume that hi ends with an (N)-rule (cf. [BW87]). This means that αi
is of the form αi+1 + 1, that Γi contains a formula Sm ∈ N , and that hi has an
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immediate subproof ∗ ⊢
αi+1
0 Γi,m ∈ N . More precisely, the sequent Γi is of the
form Γi = Γ, Sm ∈ N and the immediate subproof has end-sequent Γ,m ∈ N .
Here Γ may or may not contain the formula Sm ∈ N . If it does not we may add
this formula by weakening (see the remark after [BW87, Definition 4]), to get the
desired proof of Γ,m ∈ N,Sm ∈ N = Γi,m ∈ N . Let hi+1 be (the code of) this
proof ∗ ⊢
αi+1
0 Γi,m ∈ N . In particular we have Γi+1 = Γi,m ∈ N . This implies
k(Γi+1) = k(Γi) and thus
Ki+1 := Fωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi+1)) < Fωx+2+αi(k(Γi)) = Ki.
Note that Ki+1 can be computed by bounded minimization (i.e. as the smallest
number below Ki such that the elementary relation Ki+1 = Fωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi+1))
holds). It remains to show that Γi+1 is false in Ki+1. For all formulas in Γi ⊆ Γi+1
this holds by the obvious monotonicity property. Aiming at a contradiction, assume
that m ∈ N is true in Ki+1, i.e. that we have 3m < Ki+1. Then we get
3(m+ 1) < K2i+1 < F
2
ωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi+1)) < Fωx+2+αi(k(Γi)) = Ki.
This makes Sm ∈ N true in Ki, contradicting the assumption that Γi is false in Ki.
Case. Assume that hi ends with a rule (∧). This means that αi is of the
form αi+1 + 1, that Γi contains a formula ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1, and that hi has immediate
subproofs ∗ ⊢
αi+1
0 Γi, ϕj for j = 0, 1. By assumption ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 is false in Ki. As
“being false in Ki” is primitive recursively decidable we can pick j ∈ {0, 1} such
that ϕj is false in Ki. Let hi+1 be the corresponding subproof ∗ ⊢
αi+1
0 Γi, ϕj . As in
the previous case we compute Ki+1 < Ki. Monotonicity implies that Γi+1 is false
in Ki+1.
Case. Assume that hi ends with a rule (∨). Similar to the previous case, let
hi+1 be the (only) immediate subproof of hi.
Case. Assume that hi ends with a rule (∃). This means that αi is of the
form αi+1+1, that Γi contains a formula ∃y∈N ϕ(y), and that hi has an immediate
subproof ∗ ⊢
αi+1
0 Γi, n ∈ N ∧ ϕ(n) for some numeral m. As in the previous cases,
let hi+1 be that subproof.
Case. Assume that hi ends with an accumulation rule. Then we have an imme-
diate subproof ∗ ⊢
αi+1
0 Γi with αi+1 <k(Γi) αi. Take hi+1 to be this subproof, and
observe Γi+1 = Γi. In view of αi ≤ α0 = ω
ω·f(x)
x the ordinals ωx+2 and αi mesh
(cf. [FRW13, Section 2]). This yields ωx+2 + αi+1 <k(Γi) ωx+2 + αi and then
Ki+1 = Fωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi+1)) ≤ Fωx+2+αi(k(Γi)) = Ki,
as required for condition (iii).
Case. Assume that hi ends with a cut over the formula m ∈ N . This means
that we have immediate subproofs ∗ ⊢
αi+1
0 Γi,m ∈ N and ∗ ⊢
αi+1
0 Γi,m /∈ N
with αi = αi+1+1. If m ∈ N is false in Fωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi)) then we can take hi+1 to
be the first of these subproofs. Otherwise, let hi+1 be the second subproof. Since
m ∈ N is true in Fωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi)) we see
k(Γi+1) = max{k(Γi), 3m} < Fωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi)).
This implies
Ki+1 = Fωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi+1)) ≤ F
2
ωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi)) < Fωx+2+αi(k(Γi)) = Ki+1.
Note that any ΣN -formula in Γi+1 = Γi,m /∈ N lies in Γi. By monotonicity, these
formulas are false in Ki+1.
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Case. Assume that hi ends with a cut over an arithmetical prime formula (not
involving the relation symbol · ∈ N). Similar to the previous case, let hi+1 be the
subproof of the false premise.
Case. Assume that hi ends with a cut over a formula ∃y∈N F
∗
ε0
(m) = y. In fact,
F ∗ε0(m) = y may be any elementary relation R(m, y). Then we have immediate sub-
proofs ∗ ⊢
αi+1
0 Γi, ∃y∈N R(m, y) and ∗ ⊢
αi+1
0 Γi, ∀y∈N ¬R(m, y) with αi = αi+1 + 1.
If ∃y∈N R(m, y) is false in Fωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi)) then we can take hi+1 to be the first
of these subproofs. Otherwise ∃y∈N R(m, y) is true in Fωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi)), i.e. the
relation R(m, l) holds for some number l ∈ N with 3l < Fωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi)). By
inversion [BW87, Lemma 3] we get a proof
∗ ⊢
αi+1
0 Γi, l /∈ N,¬R(m, l).
Let hi+1 be (a code for) this proof. In Buchholz’ [Buc91] formalization of infinite
proofs it is immediate that hi+1 can be computed by a primitive recursive function
(see also the corresponding clause in [Fre15, Definition 3.5]). As in the previous
case we have
k(Γi+1) = max{k(Γi), 3l} < Fωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi))
and thus
Ki+1 = Fωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi+1)) ≤ F
2
ωx+2+αi+1(k(Γi)) < Fωx+2+αi(k(Γi)) = Ki+1.
Monotonicity ensures that Γi is false in Ki+1. By the choice of l the formula
¬R(m, l) is false as well (independently of Ki+1). 
Switching back to the realm of finite proofs, we can infer the following:
Theorem 2.2. For any primitive recursive function g : N→ N we have
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x(Fε0 (2x+ 5)↓→ Con(IΣx + F
∗
ε0
↓)↾g(x)).
Before we come to the proof, let us remark that the premise Fε0(2x + 5) ↓ can
probably be weakened to Fε0 (x) ↓. To do so one would have to make the proof
system from [BW87] more efficient, as in [CR91, FW98, Fre15]. Describing the
necessary changes would make the presentation more difficult, and the improvement
makes no difference for the existence of polynomial bounds. Also note that we
obtain a nice bound in the next result.
Proof. We will construct a primitive recursive function f such that IΣ1 proves the
following: Whenever p is a derivation IΣx + F
∗
ε0
↓ ⊢ 0 = 1 of length at most g(x),
we have (a code for) an infinite derivation ∗⊢
ω·f(2x+3)
2x+3 〈〉. The previous proposition
yields a number n with
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x≥n(Fε0(2x+ 5)↓→ ∗0
ω·f(2x+3)
2x+3 〈〉).
By the definition of f we obtain
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x≥n(Fε0(2x+ 5)↓→ Con(IΣx + F
∗
ε0
↓)↾g(x)).
This is sufficient, as the finitely many cases x < n are covered by Σ1-completeness.
The construction of f takes place in several stages: First, translate p into a proof
f0(p) of 〈〉 in the finite sequent calculus of [BW87, Section 2]. Note that [BW87]
implements addition and multiplication as relations (rather than functions). For
x ≥ 1 this does not increase the logical complexity of the induction formulas. By
choosing n ≥ 1 above we do not have to worry about the case x = 0. Next,
transform f0(p) into a proof f1(p) in which all free cuts have been eliminated (see
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e.g. [Bus98, Section 2.4.6]). This means that the only remaining cut formulas appear
in some axiom. Considering the implementation of induction in [BW87, Section 2]
the most complex cuts in f1(p) are of the form
∃x(ϕ(x) ∧ ¬ϕ(Sx)),
where ϕ is an induction formula of complexity Σx. Since the object language used
in [BW87] contains a relation symbol for each elementary relation we may assume
that ϕ is a “strict Σx-formula” of the form
ϕ ≡ ∃y1∀y2 . . . ∃/∀yxθ,
where θ is a prime formula (cf. [Fre15, Section 1]). Now embed f1(p) into the infin-
itary calculus of [BW87, Section 3], extended by the axioms n /∈ N, ∃y∈NF
∗
ε0
(n) = y
described above. We have already seen that these new axioms yield an infinite proof
∗⊢ω0 ∀x∈N∃y∈N F
∗
ε0
(x) = y, which embeds the axiom F ∗ε0 ↓ in the sense of [BW87,
Lemma 2]. The cuts in the finite proof f1(p) carry over to the infinitary system.
More precisely, the cut over ∃x(ϕ(x) ∧ ¬ϕ(Sx)) mentioned above is transformed
into a cut over the formula
∃x(x ∈ N ∧ (ϕ
N (x) ∧ ¬ϕN (Sx))),
where we have
ϕN ≡ ∃y1∈N∀y2∈N . . . ∃/∀yx∈Nθ ≡ ∃y1(y1 ∈ N ∧ ∀y2(y2 /∈ N ∨ (· · · θ · · · ))).
This means that the cut formulas in the infinite proof may have length 2x+3. The
height of the embedded proof is of the form ω · l, where l depends on the height
of p, and on the height of formulas and terms in p. Thus we get an infinite proof
∗ ⊢
ω·f2(p)
2x+3 〈〉,
where f2 is a primitive recursive function. In Buchholz’ [Buc91] formalization it is
trivial to compute codes for these embedded proofs, because the finite proof itself
represents its infinite embedding. Now set
f(2x+ 3) := max{f2(p) + 1 | p is a proof IΣx + F
∗
ε0
↓ ⊢ 0 = 1 of length ≤ g(x)}.
Clearly f is primitive recursive. Whenever p is a derivation IΣx + F
∗
ε0
↓ ⊢ 0 = 1 of
length at most g(x) we get
∗ ⊢
ω·f(2x+3)
2x+3 〈〉
by accumulation, since f2(p) < f(2x+ 3) implies ω · f2(p) <k ω · f(2x+ 3) for any
number k. 
Concerning the finite consistency of slow reflection and slow consistency over PA
we get the following result. In the next section we will construct short proofs
of Fε0 (n) ↓ in Peano arithmetic, to get short (unconditional) proofs of the finite
consistency statements.
Theorem 2.3. We have
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x(Fε0 (x)↓→ Con(PA+Con
∗(PA))↾x),
and the same with RFN∗Π2(PA) at the place of Con
∗(PA).
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Proof. By [Fre17a, Proposition 3.4] we have
IΣ1 ⊢ RFN
∗
Π2(PA)↔ F
∗
ε0
↓ .
Just as for usual provability, slow reflection implies slow consistency, i.e. we have
IΣ1 ⊢ RFN
∗
Π2(PA)→ Con
∗(PA).
Now the claim follows from the previous theorem, observing that the length of
a proof bounds the complexity of the induction formulas that it contains. More
precisely, if a proof of length x contains an induction axiom for an induction formula
with y quantifiers then we have 2y + 5 < x. In other words, we have y ≤ i(x) for
i(x) = min{y | 2(y + 1) + 5 ≥ x}.
Let g0 : N
2 → N be a primitive recursive function with the following property: If
p codes a proof PA+Con∗(PA) ⊢ 0 = 1 of length at most x then g0(p, x) codes a
proof of 0 = 1 in the theory IΣi(x) +Con
∗(PA). As we have just seen, this can be
achieved by prenexing and contracting quantifiers in the induction formulas. As the
finitely many cases x ≤ 7 are covered by Σ1-completeness we may assume x ≥ 8.
Then we have i(x) > 0, and the above implications allow us to transform g0(p, x)
into a code g1(p, x) of a proof IΣi(x)+F
∗
ε0
↓ ⊢ 0 = 1. Writing g2(p, x) for the length
of the proof g1(p, x), consider the primitive recursive function
g(y) := max{g2(p, 2(y + 1) + 5) | p is a proof PA+Con
∗(PA) ⊢ 0 = 1
of length ≤ 2(y + 1) + 5}.
Using the previous theorem for this function g we can deduce the claim: Consider
a number x with Fε0(x) ↓. As before we may assume x ≥ 5, so that we have
2 · i(x) + 5 ≤ x and thus Fε0 (2 · i(x) + 5) ↓. Aiming at a contradiction, assume
that p is a proof PA + Con∗(PA) ⊢ 0 = 1 of length at most x ≤ 2(i(x) + 1) + 5.
By construction g1(p, 2(i(x) + 1) + 5) is a proof IΣi(x) + F
∗
ε0
↓ ⊢ 0 = 1 of length
at most g(i(x)). This contradicts Con(IΣi(x) + F
∗
ε0
↓) ↾ g(i(x)), as provided by the
previous theorem. 
In particular, we can establish the following known result by purely proof-
theoretic methods. All previous proofs used non-standard models of arithmetic.
Corollary 2.4 ([FRW13]). We have
PA+Con∗(PA) 0 Con(PA).
Proof. In view of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem it suffices to show
PA+Con(PA) ⊢ Con(PA +Con∗(PA)).
Internalizing the previous theorem we have
IΣ1 ⊢ PrPA(∀x(Fε0 (x)↓→ Con(PA+Con
∗(PA))↾x)),
where PrPA(·) formalizes provability in Peano arithmetic. It is easy to see that we
have IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x PrPA(Fε0 (x˙)↓), as in [Fre17b, Lemma 1.5]. Together we get
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x PrPA(Con(PA+Con
∗(PA))↾ x˙).
Since consistency implies Π1-reflection this yields
IΣ1 +Con(PA) ⊢ ∀x Con(PA +Con
∗(PA))↾x,
as desired. 
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Beyond the previous corollary, we can bound the consistency strength of slow
reflection. Note that the following is weaker than the known result, which accomod-
ates slow reflection for arbitrary logical complexity, rather than just Π2-reflection.
Corollary 2.5 ([Fre17b]). We have
IΣ1 ⊢ Con(PA)→ Con(PA+RFN
∗
Π2(PA)).
Proof. As in the previous proof, using Theorem 2.3 for slow reflection rather than
slow consistency. 
As a consequence, we obtain a new proof of the following result. Transfinite iter-
ations of slow consistency are defined in [Fre17b, Section 3] and [HP16, Section 4].
Corollary 2.6 ([Fre17b, HP16]). The usual consistency statement for Peano arith-
metic is equivalent to ε0 iterations of slow consistency, over the base theory IΣ1.
Proof. As for the usual notion of consistency, slow Π2-reflection implies that itera-
tions of slow consistency are progressive. In other words, we have
PA+RFN∗Π2(PA) ⊢ ∀γ(∀β≺γ Con
∗
β(PA)→ Con
∗
γ(PA)),
where Con∗γ(PA) denotes the γ-th iterate of slow consistency. Also recall Gentzen’s
result that Peano arithmetic proves transfinite induction up to any fixed ordinal
below ε0. Putting these observations together we get
PA+RFN∗Π2(PA) ⊢ Con
∗
α(PA)
for each α ≺ ε0. This fact itself can be proved in the theory IΣ1. Now assume
Con(PA) and invoke the previous corollary to get Con(PA + RFN∗Π2(PA)). As
consistency implies Π1-reflection we learn that Con
∗
α(PA) does indeed hold for all
ordinals α ≺ ε0. Thus we have proved the direction
IΣ1 ⊢ Con(PA)→ ∀α≺ε0 Con
∗
α(PA).
The converse direction follows from a result of Schmerl and Beklemishev, as in
[Fre17b, Corollary 3.6] or [HP16, Lemma 18]. 
3. Proofs of Finite Consistency
In this section we construct proofs PA ⊢ Fε0 (n) ↓ which are polynomial in n.
Together with Theorem 2.3 this will yield polynomial proofs of the finite consistency
statements Con(PA+Con∗(PA))↾n. Note that there are “naive” proofs of Fε0(n)↓
via Σ1-completeness. However, as the value Fε0(n) is extremely large, these proofs
are very long. Indeed, we know from [Fre17a] that proofs of Fε0(n)↓ in the fragment
IΣn cannot be constructed by primitive recursion, let alone in a polynomial way.
This means that we have to exhaust the full power of Peano arithmetic to get the
desired polynomial proofs.
First we reduce Fε0 (n)↓ to an appropriate instance of transfinite induction: Con-
sider a formula ψ ≡ ψ(γ), possibly with further variables. As in [Fef91] we write
Prog(γ̂ ψ) ≡ ∀α(∀β≺αψ(β)→ ψ(α)),
TI(α, γ̂ ψ) ≡ Prog(γ̂ ψ)→ ∀β≺αψ(β).
It is standard to observe the following:
Lemma 3.1. We have
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x(TI(ωx+1, γ̂ Fγ ↓)→ Fε0(x)↓).
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Proof. Using [Som95, Theorem 5.3] we show that ∀β≺α Fβ ↓ implies Fα ↓: For α = 0
we have F0(x) = x + 1 by definition. If α is a limit then Fα(x) ↓ reduces to
F{α}(x)(x) ↓, where {α}(x) ≺ α is the x-th member of the fundamental sequence.
In case α = β + 1 we must establish F x+1β (x)↓ for all x. Indeed, we show F
i
β(x)↓
by induction on i. In the step we get Fβ(F
i
β(x)) ↓ by induction hypothesis and
the assumption ∀β≺α Fβ ↓. Unfortunately, [Som95, Theorem 5.3] only provides
F i+1β (x) = F
i
β(Fβ(x)) but not F
i+1
β (x) = Fβ(F
i
β(x)). The solution is to establish
∀j≤i∀y≤F i
β
(x)(F
j
β(y) = F
i
β(x)→ F
j+1
β (y) = Fβ(F
i
β(x)))
by induction on j. For j = i and y = x we get F i+1β (x) = Fβ(F
i
β(x)), as required.
We have thus established
IΣ1 ⊢ Prog(γ̂ Fγ ↓).
Together with the assumption TI(ωx+1, γ̂ Fγ ↓) we obtain ∀β≺ωx+1 Fβ ↓. Another
application of Prog(γ̂ Fγ ↓) yields Fωx+1 ↓. In particular we have Fωx+1(x)↓, which
is equivalent to Fε0(x)↓ by definition. 
By a classical result of Gentzen, transfinite induction up to each ordinal ωn+1 can
be proved in Peano arithmetic. We must show that this is possible with proofs of
polynomial length. For this purpose it will be useful to work with schematic proofs:
Add a unary predicate variable R to the language of arithmetic and write PA[R]
for the extension of Peano arithmetic to the resulting language. In particular,
the predicate R may freely occur in induction formulas. The crucial ingredient of
Gentzen’s proof of transfinite induction is the “jump formula”
J [R](γ) ≡ ∀β(∀δ≺β Rδ → ∀δ≺β+ωγ Rδ).
It is well-known that this formula has the following property:
Lemma 3.2. We have
PA[R] ⊢ ∀α(TI(α, γ̂ J [R])→ TI(ω
α, γ̂ Rγ)).
Proof. The crucial observation is
PA[R] ⊢ Prog(γ̂ Rγ)→ Prog(γ̂ J [R]).
Details can, for example, be found in the proof of [Som95, Lemma 4.4]. Aiming at
TI(ωα, γ̂ Rγ), let us now assume Prog(γ̂ Rγ). Using the assumption TI(α, γ̂ J [R])
we obtain ∀β≺α J [R](β), and then
J [R](α) ≡ ∀β(∀δ≺β Rδ → ∀δ≺β+ωα Rδ).
Setting β = 0 the premise ∀δ≺β Rδ is trivial. Thus we get ∀δ≺ωα Rδ, as required
for TI(ωα, γ̂ Rγ). 
The ordinals ωn can be reached by iterating the construction: Substitute J [R]
for the predicate variableR, to see that TI(α, γ̂ J [{γ | J [R]}]) implies TI(ωα, γ̂ J [R]).
With ωα at the place of α the lemma shows that TI(ωα, γ̂ J [R]) implies TI(ωα2 , γ̂ Rγ).
Combining these implications we obtain
PA[R] ⊢ TI(α, γ̂ J [{γ | J [R]}])→ TI(ωα2 , γ̂ Rγ).
Starting with the trivial case α = 1 we get a proof of TI(ω2, γ̂ Rγ) outright. This
does enable us to reach arbitrary ordinals ωn, but the length of the proof grows
exponentially in n: As J [R] contains two occurrences of R the formula J [{γ | J [R]}]
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will contain four such occurrences, etc. It is well-known how to circumvent this
problem: For convenience we assume that the biconditional is a primitive connective
(this can be avoided as in [Pud98, Section 3.2]). Then each formula is equivalent
to a formula with a single occurrence of R, by [FR79, Chapter 7]. In the present
case it suffices to observe the equivalence between Rδ0 → Rδ1 and
θ(δ0, δ1) ≡ ∃v0,v1 [∀z(
∨
i=0,1
z = δi → (Rz ↔
∧
i=0,1
(z = δi → vi = 1))) ∧
∧ (v0 = 1→ v1 = 1)].
Thus the above jump formula J [R] is equivalent to
J ′[R](γ) ≡ ∀β∃δ0≺β∀δ1≺β+ωγθ(δ0, δ1).
To define the required iterations, write J ′[{γ |ψ(γ)}] for the formula that results
from J ′[R] when one replaces all subformulas Rt by the formula ψ(t), renaming
bound variables as necessary. Now put
J ′0[R](γ) ≡ Rγ,
J ′n+1[R](γ) ≡ J
′[{γ | J ′n[R]}].
As promised, these modified iterations satisfy the following:
Lemma 3.3. The length of the formulas J ′n[R] is bounded by a polynomial in n.
Proof. Assuming that all variables have length one (i.e. neglecting the lengths of
their indices) we get a linear bound: Suppose that J ′n[R] has length at most k · n,
where k bounds the length of J ′[R]. As J ′[R] contains a single occurrence of R
the length of J ′n+1[R] ≡ J
′[{γ | J ′n[R]}] will be bounded by k + k · n = k · (n + 1).
According to [Pud98, Section 3.2] the contribution of the variables is at most loga-
rithmic and can in fact be avoided. 
Now we can deduce the following effective version of Gentzen’s result:
Proposition 3.4. For each number n we have
PA[R] ⊢ TI(ωn, γ̂ Rγ),
with polynomial in n proofs.
To be precise, let us remark that ωn = ω
1
n refers to the defined function symbol
(α, x) 7→ ωαx rather than the numerical code of the actual ordinal ωn. Eliminating
the defined function symbol, the proposition promises polynomial proofs of the
formulas ∃α(ω
1
n = α ∧ TI(α, γ̂ Rγ)).
Proof. In the proof from Lemma 3.2, replace J [R] by the equivalent formula J ′[R].
Also instantiate α to ωαx and observe ω
ωαx = ωαx+1, to get a proof
PA[R] ⊢ ∀x(TI(ω
α
x , γ̂ J
′[R])→ TI(ωαx+1, γ̂ Rγ)).
Replace any occurrence of Rt in this proof by J ′k[R](t), renaming bound variables as
necessary. As the axioms of PA[R] are closed under substitution this yields proofs
PA[R] ⊢ ∀x(TI(ω
α
x , γ̂ J
′
k+1[R])→ TI(ω
α
x+1, γ̂ J
′
k[R])).
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In view of the previous lemma the length of these proofs is polynomial in k. Now
instantiate x to the numeral n−(k+1), for each k < n. As (n− (k + 1))+1 = n− k
can be verified with polynomial proofs, we get
PA[R] ⊢ TI(ωαn−(k+1), γ̂ J
′
k+1[R])→ TI(ω
α
n−k, γ̂ J
′
k[R])
with proofs of length at most p(n, k), for some polynomial p. Combining these
implications from k = n− 1 (hence n− (k + 1) = 0) to k = 0 (hence J ′k[R] ≡ Rγ)
yields a proof
PA[R] ⊢ TI(ωα0 , γ̂ J
′
n[R])→ TI(ω
α
n , γ̂ Rγ).
Its length is essentially bounded by
∑
k<n p(n, k) and thus polynomial in n. For
the ordinal α = 1 (hence ωα0 = 1) we have a trivial proof of TI(ω
1
0 , γ̂ Rγ), as
in [Som95, Lemma 4.2]. Substituting J ′n[R](t) for Rt we get polynomial proofs of
the formulas TI(ω10 , γ̂ J
′
n[R]). A final application of modus ponens yields the desired
proofs PA[R] ⊢ TI(ω1n, γ̂ Rγ) of polynomial length. 
In [Fre17a] it has been shown that any proof of Fε0 (n) ↓ in the fragment IΣn
must be extremely long. This forms an interesting contrast with the feasible proofs
available in full Peano arithmetic:
Corollary 3.5. For each number n we have
PA ⊢ Fε0 (n)↓,
with polynomial in n proofs.
Proof. Substitute Ft ↓ for Rt in the proofs from the previous proposition, to get
PA ⊢ TI(ωn+1, γ̂ Fγ ↓)
with polynomial in n proofs. Instantiating Lemma 3.1 to n gives proofs
PA ⊢ TI(ωn+1, γ̂ Fγ ↓)→ Fε0(n)↓
of length polynomial (in fact logarithmic) in n. Modus ponens yields the result. 
Putting things together we obtain the following main result:
Theorem 3.6. For each number n we have
PA ⊢ Con(PA +Con∗(PA))↾n,
with polynomial in n proofs. The same holds with the slow reflection statement
RFN∗Π2(PA) at the place of the slow consistency statement Con
∗(PA).
Proof. Instantiating Theorem 2.3 to n we get proofs
PA ⊢ Fε0(n)↓→ Con(PA+Con
∗(PA))↾n
of length polynomial (in fact logarithmic) in n. Note that Theorem 2.3 provides
the same with RFN∗Π2(PA) at the place of Con
∗(PA). We can conclude by the
previous corollary. 
Pudla´k’s original conjecture states that Peano arithmetic has no polynomial
proofs of Con(PA + Con(PA)) ↾ n, with usual rather than slow consistency. The
following shows that Theorem 2.3 does not hold for usual consistency. This means
that Pudla´k’s conjecture cannot be refuted by our approach:
Proposition 3.7. We have
PA 0 ∀x(Fε0(x)↓→ Con(PA+Con(PA))↾x).
SHORT PROOFS FOR SLOW CONSISTENCY 17
Proof. Aiming at a contradiction, assume that the given statement is provable.
Then this fact can be verified in PA, i.e. we have
PA ⊢ PrPA(∀x(Fε0(x)↓→ Con(PA+Con(PA))↾x)).
As in the proof of Corollary 2.4 we have PA ⊢ ∀x PrPA(Fε0(x˙)↓). Thus we get
PA ⊢ ∀x PrPA(Con(PA+Con(PA))↾ x˙).
Since consistency implies Π1-reflection this yields
PA+Con(PA) ⊢ ∀xCon(PA+Con(PA))↾x,
which contradicts Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem. 
In view of this negative result, let us conclude with the following general question:
Question 3.8. For any r.e. theory T one could ask about the least recursive or-
dinal α (in some natural ordinal notation system) such that
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀x(Fα(x)↓→ Con(T)↾x).
In particular, we find the question interesting for IΣn (n ≥ 2), PA + Con(PA),
and natural fragments of second-order arithmetic. How does it relate to the proof-
theoretic ordinal of the theory T?
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